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Religion and technological 
development 
in China and Europe 
between about 700 and 1800
Karel DAVIDS *
Résumé
Le développement technique a de plus en plus divergé entre Chine et Europe après 
1500. Cet article soutient qu’on ne peut pas seulement expliquer cette divergence par 
des variables économiques comme les prix du combustible et de la main-d’œuvre. 
Sont également intervenues des variations dans les contextes religieux en Chine et 
en Europe. Mais, contrairement aux considérations de nombreux historiens et théo-
logiens, le facteur-clé ne peut pas être trouvé dans les différences de croyances et de 
valeurs dans les traditions religieuses. Plus pertinentes ont été les différences dans 
l’influence des institutions religieuses et dans le rôle des communications et des mou-
vements de personnes imputables aux traditions religieuses. Ces aspects de la reli-
gion ont contribué à des disparités dans la formation des hommes, la circulation des 
connaissances et l’innovation technique entre Chine et Europe qui se sont manifestées 
après 1500.
Mots-clés : circulation des connaissances, formation, innovation technique, institutions 
religieuses, traditions religieuses.
Abstract
The development of technology in China and Europe increasingly diverged after about 1500. 
This article argues that this divergence can not only be explained by economic variables such 
as relative prices of fuel and labour. Variations in religious contexts in China and Europe mat-
tered too. Contrary to views of many historians and theologians, however, the key factor cannot 
*. Karel Davids is Professor of Economic and Social History at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands. His main ields of interest are global history, history of technology, history of knowledge 
and maritime history. Recent major publication : Religion, Technology and the Great and Little Divergences. 
China and Europe Compared, c. 700-1800, Leiden/Boston, Brill, 2013.
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be found in differences in beliefs and values in religious traditions. More relevant were differ-
ences in the impact of religious institutions and in the role of communications and movements 
of people related to religious traditions. It is argued that these aspects of religion contributed 
to disparities in human capital formation and circulation of knowledge as well as technical 
innovation between China and Europe that became manifest after 1500.
Keywords: circulation of knowledge, human capital formation, religious 
institutions,religious traditions, technological innovation.
Comparing technology in China and Europe
Until the early nineteenth century, 
technological developments in China 
and Europe showed similarities in many 
respects. Both China and Europe saw 
long periods of incremental technolo-
gical change, interspersed with eruptions 
of more intense innovative activity1. The 
fact that technological breakthrough 
eventually occurred in Europe and not 
in China should not lead us to exagge-
rate differences in the level or direction 
of technological change in Europe and 
China before 1800.
Take for example the variety of 
machines and implements used in China 
and Europe. In his famous Science and 
civilisation in China, Joseph Needham 
listed a wide range of wooden or bamboo 
devices with revolving or spinning com-
ponents, powered by animals, humans 
or water, which were employed to carry 
out certain productive functions in agri-
culture, mining or industry in China 
before the nineteenth century. Among 
these machines were querns, animal-
powered grinding mills, hand-driven 
chain pumps, scoop-wheels moved by 
humans or animals for lifting water into 
fields, winches for mine-shafts, human-
driven winnowing-fans, water-powered 
bellows, water-driven multi-spindle 
spinning frames and vertical two-roller 
sugar cane crushers powered by ani-
mals2. All the different types of machines 
and mechanical devices described in 
Needham’s work could also be found in 
late medieval and early modern Europe, 
although they were not always made of 
the same sort of materials. China and 
Europe did not profoundly diverge in 
the orientation of technological change 
either. The approach is now slightly 
different among historians. Using a dis-
tinction introduced by Francesca Bray, 
Bozhong Li suggested that technolo-
gies in China were «  skill-oriented  », 
whereas technologies in Europe were 
« mechanical ». Mechanical technologies 
« favour the development of equipment 
and machinery as a substitute for human 
labour  », skill-oriented technologies 
«  tend towards the development and 
intensive use of human skills, both prac-
tical and managerial3 ». But granted that 
Europe in «  mechanical  » technologies 
followed a more consistent trajectory than 
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China, the economically most advanced 
parts of Europe, such as the Netherlands, 
throughout the early modern period 
nevertheless also continued to make 
great strides in « skill-oriented » techno-
logies4. Qing China also saw the adop-
tion of labour-saving improvements; in 
other words, China did develop and used 
« mechanical » technologies5. Therefore, 
the distinction between «  mechanical  » 
and «  skill-oriented  » thus does not 
neatly map on the distinction between 
Europe and China.
Yet, despite these similarities in the 
level and direction of technological 
change, important differences between 
China and Europe emerged as well, 
especially from about 1500 onwards. 
Technological development in China 
focused on different sectors than in 
Europe. In contrast with Mark Elvin’s 
thesis that late Ming and Qing China 
suffered from «  a relative technological 
standstill » due to a combination of high 
agricultural productivity, nearly static 
markets and cheapening labour («  the 
high-equilibrium trap  »)6, historians of 
China recently have argued that Qing 
China still witnessed significant tech-
nological advance. What is striking, 
though, is that they lay more emphasis 
on changes in the agricultural sector than 
on innovations in urban industries or 
in maritime transport. To establish that 
Qing China did see technological change, 
scholars seem to overwhelmingly draw 
attention to the diffusion of new crops 
(such as sweet potatoes or maize) and of 
new varieties of rice, to the spread of new 
ways of tilling the soil and to the disse-
mination of various improvements in 
cropping systems, fertilizer use or sugar 
processing techniques7. In industry, silk 
production and porcelain manufacture 
are highlighted as sectors in which China 
for a long time was more advanced than 
Europe8. On the other hand, the demand 
for skills of Jesuit missionaries at the 
Qing court in the eighteenth century 
suggests that the Chinese could learn 
something from Europeans as well. Qing 
emperors valued Jesuits not only for their 
knowledge of astronomy and mathe-
matics and their expertise in building 
machines and in making clocks, auto-
mata and scientific instruments, but also 
for their abilities in a wide range of other 
specialties: they supervised, notably, the 
founding of cannon, they participated 
in surveys of the empire, they produced 
maps, they made oil paintings, they led 
operations in glass making, they desi-
gned fountains, gardens and palaces 
and they introduced new plants and 
medicines9.
Moreover, the potential of specific 
techniques and artefacts that were 
known both in China and in Europe 
was not always as fully realized in the 
former region as in the latter10. Clocks, 
cannon, the magnetic compass and 
printing by movable type are perhaps 
the best-known cases in point, but they 
are by no means the only ones. Other 
examples are the multi-spindle spinning 
machine, which was known in China as 
early as the fourteenth century but in 
contrast with Europe was not adopted 
in cotton spinning11, or the vertical two-
roller sugar cane crusher, powered by 
animals, which entered China in the 
seventeenth century at about the same 
time as European plantation colonies in 
the Americas, but did not evolve into 
the even more productive animal-driven 
or water-driven three-roller type12. 
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Technology in use in China and Europe 
thus could differ more than a survey of 
technological potential may suggest.
At the end of the day, it was Europe, 
not China, where the transition to a 
modern industrial economy began and 
sustained economic growth took off. The 
beginning of modern economic growth 
is nowadays widely seen as a result of 
a dramatic shift in energy basis, which 
allowed an unprecedented rise in energy 
consumption and a huge increase in pro-
ductivity. This change in energy basis, 
which essentially revolved on a large-
scale transition from the use of energy 
from sources above the surface of the 
earth (such as timber) to energy derived 
from sources stocked below the surface 
of the earth (such as fossil fuels) implied 
a fundamental transformation in the 
relation between human societies and 
the natural environment13. By shifting 
to this new energy regime from the late 
eighteenth century onwards, Europe set 
out on an entirely different path of eco-
nomic and technological development 
than China and the rest of the world.
Explaining variations in technological change
Where did these variations in tech-
nological change between China and 
Europe come from? Some historians 
seek an explanation in proximate causes, 
such as relative factor prices. Robert 
Allen, for example, argues that whereas 
in eighteenth-century Britain the high 
cost of labour compared to energy was 
a powerful incentive to substitute fuel 
for labour, no such stimulus worked 
in China, because access to fuel was 
expensive relative to labour14. However, 
explanations based on proximate causes 
do not make clear why technological 
change in China and Europe differed by 
sector, or even more importantly, how 
knowledge was created and where it 
came from. To answer such questions, 
we have to probe into more fundamental 
factors that affect technological develop-
ment. One of the underlying factors that 
needs further scrutiny is the relationship 
between technology and religion.
David Landes noted that various scho-
lars have sought the explanation for the 
European’ «  invention of invention  » 
in a particular set of religious values, 
such as the «  Judeo-Christian’ «  respect 
for manual labor », «  the subordination 
of nature to man » and « sense of linear 
time  », although he himself preferred 
to seek the ultimate cause in market 
forces15. Rolf Sieferle likewise included 
religious factors among the relevant 
circumstances that made the eventual 
industrial transformation in Europe pos-
sible16. Joel Mokyr observed that «  reli-
gion, technology and society were often 
intertwined in ways that defy easy gene-
ralization but that had an evident effect 
on technological creativity17 ».
When Western scholars rediscovered 
the full scale of past Chinese achie-
vements in technology, the issue of 
the religious context of technological 
development also became an issue in 
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the historiography on China18. Joseph 
Needham suggested that especially 
Daoism, and to a lesser extent Buddhism, 
offered a highly favourable environment 
for the development of particular tech-
niques, notably in chemistry, medicine 
and dietetics. Confucianism, in contrast, 
showed a much more reserved attitude 
towards technological innovation; and it 
was Confucianism, reshaped as «  Neo-
Confucianism  » under the Southern 
Song period (960-1279) that eventually 
became the dominant value-system in 
the Chinese State19.
Regarding Europe, R. J.  Forbes, Lynn 
White, Carl Amery, Ernest Benz and 
other historians of technology, historians 
of religion, and theologians have insisted 
that the beliefs and values of Christianity, 
especially in Latin Christendom, exerted 
a significant influence on the develop-
ment of technology20. In its general form, 
the argument runs that Christianity 
and/or the organized Church paved the 
way for technological advance by crea-
ting a sharp distinction between man 
and nature. Because Christianity is said 
to place man above the rest of physical 
creation, while denying rivers, trees or 
hills their own «  spirits  » and refusing 
to accept the view of the cosmos as a 
living organism, it is supposed to have 
laid the basis for a more domineering 
and conquering attitude on the part of 
humans towards the natural world. It 
was easier to manipulate nature once 
nature supposedly had lost its soul.
To assess the merits of such claims about 
the relation between religious contexts 
and technological change, it is necessary 
to start by recognising that religion is a 
multi-faceted phenomenon, which finds 
expression in people’s beliefs, practices 
and experiences, in institutions and in 
media, as well as in rituals, images and 
doctrines. Sociologist of religion Steve 
Bruce offers the following definition that, 
in his view, « fits with broad contempo-
rary common-sense reflection on the 
matter »: « Religion… consists of beliefs, 
actions, and institutions, which assume 
the existence of supernatural entities 
with powers of action, or impersonal 
powers or processes possessed of moral 
purpose21. » Charles Taylor concurs, pro-
vided one keeps in mind that the line of 
demarcation between the natural and 
the supernatural is drawn less sharply in 
non-Western cultures and can change in 
the course of time22.
Using this broad concept of religion 
as guidance, let us to examine to what 
extent disparities in the evolution of tech-
nical knowledge between Europe and 
China can be explained by differences in 
religious context? Starting with beliefs 
and values about relations between man 
and nature, I will next move via the 
domains of institutions, patterns of com-
munication and movements of people 
to the field of practices and experiences 




Religious traditions and visions of nature
Contrary to what many authors have 
claimed, differences in religious beliefs 
and values cannot explain differences 
in technological development. Religious 
traditions do not consistently offer a par-
ticular vision of nature that may explain 
why humans are more, or less, prepared 
to exploit the natural environment for 
their own uses. Latin Christianity in fact 
did not always and everywhere condone 
the ruthless domination of nature. The 
Bible allows a variety of interpretations 
concerning the way humans should treat 
the natural world. Both exploitation 
and stewardship can be justified with 
a reference to Holy Scripture. There is 
no evidence that the Latin Church, or 
Christians in Western Europe in general, 
from the Middle Ages onwards only 
adhered to an interpretation that vindi-
cated an exploitative attitude to nature23.
Religious traditions in China did not 
show a consistent bias in one direc-
tion or another either. Robert Weller 
observed that most visions of nature in 
China are «  perfectly comfortable with 
manipulating natural forces for human 
benefit  », even though the forms taken 
by these visions could vary widely.24 
In this respect, Confucian, Daoist or 
Buddhist traditions differed less than 
Needham supposed. Derek Bodde dis-
tinguished seven approaches to nature 
in the history of China, ranging from 
rejection via exploitation, analysis and 
animistic and moralistic views to a total, 
mystical union with the natural world. 
These approaches were neither mutually 
exclusive nor solely linked to particular 
religious traditions25. The idea that in 
Chinese thought, « man » and « nature » 
have always been viewed as a seamless 
whole and that harmony with nature 
has invariably been seen as the ultimate 
ideal, turns out to be largely a construc-
tion of twentieth-century scholars26. 
Seeking explanations for differences in 
technological development in variations 
in religious beliefs and values thus seems 
to lead to a dead end.
The impact of differences in 
religious 
context in China and Europa
Still, variations in religious context did 
matter for the divergence in technology 
between China and Europe, but in other 
ways than many a historian or theologian 
has imagined. Differences in religious 
institutions and in patterns of communi-
cations and movements of people related 
to religious traditions were much more 
important than differences in beliefs and 
values. These very factors in the course 
of time contributed to disparities in 
human capital formation, circulation of 
knowledge and technical innovation.
The relations between governments, 
markets and religious institutions in 
China and Europe developed along 
different paths. In China, the balance 
between these three forces in the field of 
technology from the Song period (960-
1279) onwards tilted heavily towards 
the central government. The reduction of 
the weight of religious institutions was 
only partly compensated by the expan-
ding share of the role played by markets. 
While in Europe, the weight of govern-
ments and markets in human capital 
formation, circulation of knowledge 
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and the creation of new technologies 
had substantially increased from the 
High Middle Ages (fith-tenth centuries) 
onwards, too, religious organizations, in 
particular those of the Catholic Church, 
continued to have a strong impact in all 
three areas as well.
Religious institutions in China from 
the Song period onwards were increa-
singly relegated to a subordinate position 
both in informal and formal learning. 
«  Informal  » learning includes learning 
by using and learning by doing, formal 
learning comprises learning by schoo-
ling or by institutions for research and 
development. Under the Song, Buddhist 
monasteries for example gradually 
lost the importance as leading centres 
of education and printing which they 
enjoyed during much of the Tang period 
(618-907)27. In Latin Christendom, by 
contrast, monasteries and church buil-
ding sites, especially between c.1100 and 
1500, offered craftsmen plenty of oppor-
tunities for informal and formal learning 
and thus aided human capital forma-
tion. Before 1500, religious institutions in 
Europe did not only make a much larger 
contribution to the supply of formal 
education than state governments, but 
they continued to be significant sup-
pliers of educational facilities even after 
secular governments and commercial 
entrepreneurs entered the field. From 
the sixteenth century onwards, reli-
gious institutions, especially in Spain, 
Italy, France and other Catholic regions, 
made a remarkable comeback in elemen-
tary, secondary and higher education. In 
many places in Europe, they were at the 
forefront of the development of voca-
tional and technical training.
For example, Colbert’s grand scheme 
to endow France with royal chairs 
in navigation in Le Havre (1660) and 
Nantes (1672) and the establishment 
of training colleges for naval officers in 
Brest, Rochefort and Toulon (1682) could 
only be realized thanks to the new reli-
gious organizations that arose during the 
Catholic Reformation. Many teaching 
posts at the newly-created schools were 
filled by members of the Society of Jesus. 
Some of the posts were even established 
in Jesuit colleges, although the courses 
could also be attended by external pupils. 
Jesuits were very active in the spread of 
nautical knowledge in France28.
Religious organizations in France 
also became involved in technical edu-
cation at an intermediate level29. The 
most active organization in this field was 
the congregation of the Brothers of the 
Christian Schools, which was founded 
by Jean-Baptiste de la Salle in 1680. In the 
eighteenth century, the Frères des Écoles 
Chrétiennes set up navigation schools 
in Vannes and Nantes and a school of 
commerce at Boulogne, offered courses 
in drawing and geometry in inland 
towns such as Cahors and Castres, and 
established boarding schools combi-
ning instruction in applied sciences 
with vocational training for careers in 
surveying, accounting, navigation and 
government service in a dozen cities and 
towns in various parts of France. There 
was never a shortage of applicants. At 
the level of primary schooling, charity 
companies within parishes, founded 
under the impulse of the Catholic 
Reformation after 1650, and the Frères des 
Écoles Chrétiennes provided free educa-
tion in reading, writing, arithmetic and 
other skills for children from poor fami-
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lies, as preparation for their guild-super-
vised period of apprenticeship30.
Moreover, circulation of technical 
knowledge was in Europe to a greater 
extent bound up with religious institu-
tions, rituals and practices than in China. 
Religious travelling served as a channel 
for flows of technical knowledge from 
the High Middle Ages onwards. Aside 
from the widespread practice of pil-
grimage, which had a counterpart in 
journeys to temple fairs or birthday cele-
brations of local deities in China, the rise 
of networks between monastic houses 
in Europe was especially important. 
Filiation relationships between monaste-
ries in the Cluniac and in the Cistercian 
networks and institutional arrangements 
for visitation and mutual consultation, 
facilitated for example the diffusion of 
innovations in hydraulic technology. As 
demonstrated by Roberta Magnusson, 
the Cistercians even « seem to have had 
something of a policy of sending out 
architects to help instruct the members 
of new foundations31  ». In 1133, Saint 
Bernard of Clairvaux sent a senior monk 
from his monastery to a new commu-
nity in Fountains to instruct its members 
not only in Cistercian customs, but also 
in architecture and the craft of plum-
bing32. Religious houses, in their turn, 
«  functioned as vital communication 
channels of the diffusion of awareness » 
of innovations in hydraulic technology 
to medieval townsmen33. Similar ins-
titutionalized patterns of knowledge 
circulation between Buddhist or Daoist 
monasteries in China does not seem to 
have existed.
Reform movements in the Catholic 
Church further stimulated the accu-
mulation and circulation of technical 
knowledge from the sixteenth century 
onwards. Organizations that battled 
in the forefront of the educational and 
missionary campaigns of the Catholic 
Reformation, such as the Society of 
Jesus, often were also very active in crea-
ting sites for the collection and storage 
of technical information, such as libra-
ries, gardens, curiosity cabinets, model 
collections and museums. Missionary 
fervour moreover gave a powerful boost 
to long-distance travel by Europeans, 
which added massively to the flows of 
knowledge between Asia, the Americas 
and Europe. Jesuits transmitted precious 
information on Chinese technologies 
(such as porcelain-making) to Europe 
and even continued to do so after their 
Society, under pressure from Catholic 
states, had been dissolved by the Pope in 
177334.
Technical innovation, too, was 
influenced by religious contexts. Before 
about 1500, religious institutions both in 
China and in Europe formed a friendly 
environment for innovations. The rise of 
woodblock printing in China from the 
eighth century onwards, for example, 
was closely connected with Buddhist 
monasteries and the reproduction and 
diffusion of sacred images and texts.
The boom in temple construction from 
the Tang dynasty to the Yuan dynasty 
(1279-1368) made a major contribution 
to the perfection of a system of building 
large structures with standardized parts. 
Temples were repeatedly rebuilt, refur-
bished or adorned with pagodas. While 
newly-built temples under the Song or 
Yuan were sometimes affiliated with a 
Buddhist or Daoist school or movement, 
they were often devoted to the cult of 
some local or supra-local deity, in which 
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« ritual masters » from different traditions 
could be involved. These temples were 
affiliated to a senior temple according to a 
specific hierarchy. Peasants from several 
villages joined in worshiping societies 
that built a common temple, devoted to 
a local deity. Small, rural temples were in 
turn subordinated to a major temple in 
a nearby market town, which was often 
erected by a rich landowner or a mer-
chant. Richard von Glahn had drawn a 
direct parallel between what happened 
in China and Europe: «  Rising market 
towns of the Yangzi Delta bore a close 
resemblance to the cathedral towns of 
contemporary Europe. In both cases, 
the towns’ affluence was inseparable 
from the magnificence of their religious 
monuments35. »
In Europe, building sites of cathe-
drals during the Middle Ages effectively 
functioned as laboratories of innovation 
in construction techniques. Temples 
in China and monasteries in Europe 
moreover pioneered the development 
of new techniques in water supply36. But 
were these booms in church and temple 
building in Europe and China of equal 
importance for informal learning? The 
great age of temple-building in China did 
not last as long as the boom in church-
building in Europe. The Chinese buil-
ding boom by and large came to an end 
in the middle of the fourteenth century, 
when the empire was severely shaken 
by internal conflicts and when the newly 
established Ming dynasty prevailed 
and began to clamp down on all mani-
festations of religious life that did not 
conform with the newly-propagated cult 
of the state. As a result of this stringent 
unifying policy, the number of Buddhist 
and Daoist temples and shrines drama-
tically declined. The building drive of 
great churches in Europe, by contrast, 
continued right into the mid-eighteenth 
century. St Peter’s Basilica in Rome 
and St Paul’s Cathedral in London, to 
mention just two examples, were not 
completed until the second half of the 
seventeenth century37.
Thus the relation between innova-
tion and religious contexts in China 
and Europe began to diverge after 
1500. The crucial difference was that in 
China technical innovation to a much 
greater extent than in Europe took place 
outside the context of religious institu-
tions. Technological change under the 
Ming and Qing (1644-1912) became 
increasingly dependent on the support 
from the state. Technological develop-
ment in silk manufacture, salt produc-
tion in Sichuan, porcelain making in 
Jingdezhen or water management in the 
Yangzi Delta, for example, largely took 
place under the impetus and supervi-
sion of public officials and the central 
government38. Although great inven-
tors could be honoured with a shrine 
or a biography, material incentives for 
individuals to invent new things did 
not exist. A market demand for the ser-
vices of technical experts like architects 
or engineers hardly emerged. China 
knew a large number of engineers, but 
they were mainly active as government 
employees39.
In Europe, secular actors and institu-
tions became progressively more impor-
tant in technological innovation from the 
Late Middle Ages onwards. The expan-
sion of the market economy, the rise 
of urban noble courts and the growth 
of patronage by secular governments 
created a range of opportunities for 
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resourceful technical practitioners and 
artisans. Governments introduced incen-
tives for innovation, such as patents, 
which consisted both of individualized 
rewards and provisions to benefit the 
community at large. Religious organiza-
tions thus gradually lost ground to other 
types of actors and institutions.
In contrast with China, however, 
the context for technological innova-
tion after 1500 did not become purely 
secular. This was especially the case in 
parts of Europe that remained predomi-
nantly Catholic, such as Italy, France, the 
Iberian Peninsula, Austria and Southern 
Germany. A variety of institutions and 
actors facilitated or promoted techno-
logical innovation, including not only 
princes, dukes, noblemen, cities, mer-
chants and craft guilds, but also reli-
gious orders, bishops and popes. In the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, reli-
gious institutions in Europe contributed 
much more to innovation than temples 
or monasteries in China during the same 
period. And the best example can be 
found in the heart of Latin Christendom, 
papal Rome.
After the papacy finally re-established 
its seat in Rome in the early fifteenth cen-
tury, ecclesiastical authorities embarked 
on a huge, long-term project of exten-
ding, reconstructing and beautifying the 
city. This vast, religion-inspired urbanist 
programme ranged all the way from 
improvement of public utilities and res-
tructuring of public space to the erec-
tion of imposing monuments and the 
construction of glorious residences and 
magnificent religious buildings. Legions 
of craftsmen, artists, architects and engi-
neers, supervised by a steadily growing 
papal bureaucracy, provided the expan-
ding city with a myriad of new streets, 
squares, fountains, fortifications, gates, 
bridges and river embankments40. Public 
spaces were adorned with statues and 
monuments reflecting the bonds between 
papal Rome, Antiquity and Eternity. 
Erecting these structures and artefacts 
often involved extraordinary and inno-
vative feats of engineering. The removal 
of the Vatican obelisk to a position in 
the square facing the new St Peter’s 
Basilica in 1585-1586, under the super-
vision of architect-engineer Domenico 
Fontana and with the help of hundreds 
of men and horses powering dozens of 
winches and pulleys, was a first-rate 
technological achievement, publicized 
and studied all over Europe during the 
late sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries41. Roman buildings like the Jesuits’ 
Gesù were an inspiration for the design 
of Catholic churches in many places 
in Europe, the Americas and Asia. The 
city of Rome attracted large numbers 
of pilgrims and non-religious travellers 
such as mathematician John Wilkins and 
architect Inigo Jones from England. An 
estimated 30.000 pilgrims visited the city 
in a normal year, and some 100.000 in a 
Jubilee Year, which from 1450 took place 
once every 25 years42. Many Europeans 
thus could see this «  model city  » with 
their own eyes. The influence of achie-
vements in Rome extended far into the 
world.
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Epilogue
The technological trajectories of China 
and Europe increasingly diverged after 
about 1500. This divergence in tech-
nological development cannot only be 
explained by economic variables such 
as relative prices of fuel and labour. 
Variations in religious contexts in China 
and Europe mattered as well. Contrary 
to ingrained convictions among many 
historians and theologians, however, 
the key factor cannot be found in diffe-
rences in beliefs and values in religious 
traditions. Both in China and in Europe, 
visions of nature in religious traditions 
in fact covered the entire spectrum from 
exploitation to harmony with the natural 
environment. What proved to be more 
relevant, were differences in the impact 
of religious institutions and in the role 
of communications and movements of 
people related to religious traditions. It 
were these aspects of religion rather than 
beliefs and values, which contributed 
to the disparities in human capital for-
mation, circulation of knowledge and 
technical innovation between China and 
Europe that became manifest after 1500.
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